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Abstract. We propose an approach on model checking information flow
for imperative language with procedures. We characterize our model with
pushdown system, which has a stack of unbounded length that naturally
models the execution of procedural programs. Because the type-based
static analysis is sometimes too conservative and rejects safe program
as ill-typed, we take a semantic-based approach by self-composing sym-
bolic pushdown system and specifying noninterference with LTL for-
mula. Then we verify this LTL-expressed property via model checker
Moped. Except for overcoming the conservative characteristic of type-
based approach, our motivation also includes the insufficient state of arts
on precise information flow analysis under inter-procedural setting. To
remedy the inefficiency of model checking compared with type system,
we propose both compact form and contracted form of self-composition.
According to our experimental results, they can greatly increase the ef-
ficiency of realistic verification. Our method provides flexibility on sepa-
rating program abstraction from noninterference verification, thus could
be expected to use on different programming languages.
1 Introduction
Noninterference is a standard criterion to formalize secure information flow. This
property was first introduced by Goguen and Meseguer[1] for multi-level com-
puting system and applied to programming language via semantic model. It
commonly means any two runs of program starting in two indistinguishable
states yield two indistinguishable final states. That is to say, for any pair of runs
the difference on secret input are unobservable via public output.
Typical information flow analyses are studied using security type system
[2][3][4][5][6]. These type systems guarantee well-typed programs do not leak
any secret information. But these type-based approaches are considered overly
conservative and sometimes reject safe programs, such as l := h · 0. Take the
following program as another example,
⋆ This work was partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of
China under Grant No. 60773163.
i f ( l ) y:=h ; else sk ip ;
i f ( ! l ) x:=y ; else sk ip ;
Suppose l and x are low, while h and y are high, standard type system[2] rejects
this program over-restrictively by reporting a flow from h to x.
To remedy this problem, semantic-based approaches[7][8] are developed, es-
pecially a recent popular approach, self-composition [9][10], which composes the
original program with a variable-renamed copy to avoid considering correlative
executions as pair. Model checking is an important method to verify properties of
semantic-based program model. It is well-known as fully-automated and mature
tool-supported. Though argued against the high complexity, model checking has
been used to check noninterference, combined with abstract interpretation[11],
self-composition[10][12], and type-based approach[12].
Lots of existing work get into the spectrum of discussing noninterference over
more complex program constructs. Procedure is considered as a common feature
of realistic imperative languages. In some applications we need to verify code
from different sources together. Also there may be context-sensitive procedure
calls in program. Noninterference verification of these programs involves inter-
procedural information flow. Consider the program below
int h , l ;
. . .
func (h , l ) ;
. . .
void func ( int a , int &b) {
int c :=0;
while (a>0) { c++; a−−; }
b:=c ;
}
after func returns, the high variable h has indirectly passed to the low variable
l. Suppose the global variables are only observable after func returns, inter-
procedural analysis is required. Volpano and Smith[3] has developed a non-
standard type system to check information flow of an imperative language with
procedures. But for the more precise approaches[12][10][11], procedure is not
considered.
Some work treats information flow with program logic in procedural setting.
Beringer et al.[13] adapt type-based approach to Hoare-like logic and introduce
an auxiliary binary formulae to encode noninterference according to the princi-
ple of self-composition. Their procedure model is only restricted to parameterless
form. Amtoft et al.[14] propose a Hoare-like logic to analyze inter-procedural in-
formation flow with independence assertion for object-oriented language. Method
call in object-oriented language introduces additional impreciseness because of
pointer aliasing on concrete location. Their procedure form is different from pro-
cedure of imperative languages and the memory model is much more complex.
Hammer et al.[15] investigate an approach for information flow control based
on a well-known program slicing technique, program dependence graph (PDG).
Inter-procedural information flow control can be achieved by computing sum-
mary graph and constructing system dependence graph (SDG). They introduce
path condition[16][17] to improve the preciseness. Since PDG has been applied
to handle realistic programs in C and Java, their approach seems quite general.
But in their approach impreciseness comes from the construction of PDGs/S-
DGs. Programs should be translated into static single form (SSA) and the size
of path condition should be reduced. This method is also much more expensive
than type-based approaches and conservative because we cannot exclude safe
program if some PC(y,x)≡true.
The relative insufficient study on inter-procedural information flow in state
of arts motivates us to propose a general inter-procedural framework for more
precise information flow analyses than the type-based approaches. Our model
is based on symbolic pushdown system[18]. A pushdown system is a transition
system with a stack of unbounded length in states. This unbounded stack pro-
vides a natural way to model the execution of program with procedure. The
state of pushdown system includes control locations and stack symbols. Control
locations are used to store global variables. Stack symbols contain both control
points and local variables of procedure. This semantic model has been proved
sound to our language and can be directly expressed as the input of model
checker Moped[19].
The verification process consists of the following phases. First a symbolic
pushdown system is derived from core-language program. Then we self-compose
the derived symbolic pushdown system and express noninterference with LTL
formula as the inputs of Moped. Verification is then performed by Moped. If
noninterference is violated by the program model, we can get a single coun-
terexample. This witness trace can help us find out which high variable causes
the insecure information flow, thus be useful for secure program development.
We have experimentally proved that our method is more precise than ordinary
type-based analysis on inter-procedural information flow. Considering the rela-
tive high complexity of model checking, we have developed two derived forms of
ordinary self-composition, called compact self-composition and contracted self-
composition. The experiments indicate great efficiency improvement with these
derived forms compared with ordinary self-composition. Another advantage of
our approach is the flexibility unveiled by self-composing symbolic pushdown
system instead of high-level language. Unlike other work did self-composition
directly on high-level languages[12][10], our approach separates the possible ab-
stractions of high-level languages from noninterference verification. Although we
use a simple imperative language with procedure for simplicity, we believe it
possible to apply our approach to different high-level programming languages
by abstracting them into pushdown systems.
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sketches the simple
imperative language and presents symbolic pushdown system derivation. Sec-
tion 3 proposes the algorithms of both ordinary form and derived forms of self-
composition for composing pushdown system, and introduces how to specify
noninterference with LTL. We report our experiments in Section 4 and possible
discussions in Section 5.
v : := c | true | false (value)
e : := x | v | l | e1 ◦ e2 | proc(in x1, out x2)S (expression)
S : := skip | e := e′ | if e then S1 else S2 | while e do S | S1; S2
| letvar x := e in S | e(e1, e2) (statement)
Fig. 1. Language Syntax
(µ, λ, v) ↓ v
(VAR)
(µ, λ, e1) ↓ v1 (µ, λ, e2) ↓ v2
(µ, λ, e1 ◦ e2) ↓ v1 ◦ v2
(BINOP)
(µ, λ, l) ↓ µ(l)
l ∈ dom(µ) (HEAPLOC)
(µ, λ, l) ↓ λ(l)
l ∈ dom(λ) (STACKLOC)
(µ, λ, S1) ↓ (µ
′, λ′) (µ′, λ′, S2) ↓ (µ
′′, λ′′)
(µ, λ, S1; S2) ↓ (µ
′′, λ′′)
(SEQUENCE)
(µ, λ, e) ↓ true (µ, λ, S1) ↓ (µ
′, λ′)
(µ, λ, if e then S1 else S2) ↓ (µ
′, λ′)
(IF-T)
(µ, λ, e) ↓ false (µ, λ, S2) ↓ (µ
′, λ′)
(µ, λ, if e then S1 else S2) ↓ (µ
′, λ′)
(IF-F)
(µ, λ, e) ↓ v
(µ, λ, l := e) ↓ (µ[l := v], λ)
l ∈ dom(µ) (UPDATE-HEAP)
(µ, λ, e) ↓ v
(µ, λ, l := e) ↓ (µ, λ[l := v])
l ∈ dom(λ) (UPDATE-STACK)
(µ, λ, skip) ↓ (µ, λ)
(SKIP)
(µ, λ, e) ↓ false
(µ, λ,while e do S) ↓ (µ, λ)
(WHILE-F)
(µ, λ, e) ↓ true (µ, λ, S) ↓ (µ
′
, λ
′
) (µ
′
, λ
′
,while e do S) ↓ (µ
′′
, λ
′′
)
(µ, λ,while e do S) ↓ (µ′′, λ′′)
(WHILE-T)
(µ, λ, e) ↓ v (µ, λ ⊎ [l := v], [l/x]S) ↓ (µ′, λ′)
(µ, λ, letvar x := e in S) ↓ (µ′, λ′ \ {l})
l /∈ dom(µ) and l /∈ dom(λ) (BINDVAR)
(µ, λ, e) ↓ v (µ, λ ⊎ [l′ := v], [l′/x1][l/x2]S) ↓ (µ
′, λ′)
(µ, λ, (proc(in x1, out x2)S)(e, l)) ↓ (µ
′
, λ
′
\ {l
′
})
l′ /∈ dom(µ) and l′ /∈ dom(λ) (CALL)
Fig. 2. Induction Rules
2 Program Modeling
2.1 Language Syntax and Semantics
The syntax of our core language with first-order procedure is given in Fig. 1. l is
memory location. The in parameter is local while the out parameter represents
reference to global variable. The big-step operational semantics are presented in
Fig. 2. µ, λ ⊆ L × V are heap and stack respectively, where L is the domain of
memory location and V is the domain of value. dom(µ)∩dom(λ) = ∅. λ⊎ [l := v]
extends λ with a new l assigned with v. BINDVAR stores v to new location l
of λ and refers each free occurrence of x in S to l. Therefore the scope of x
is S, and l is deallocated after the execution of S. We assume all substitutions
capture-avoiding and procedure main non-recursive.
2.2 Pushdown System
Definition 1 (Pushdown System). A pushdown system is a triple P =
(P, Γ,∆). P is a finite set of control location, Γ is stack alphabet, and ∆ ⊆
(P × Γ ) × (P × Γ ∗) is a finite set of pushdown rules. The pushdown rule
has a form of 〈p, γ〉 →֒ 〈p′, w〉 to represent the relation ((p, γ), (p′, w)), where
p, p′ ∈ P, γ ∈ Γ,w ∈ Γ ∗. A configuration of P is a pair 〈p, w〉, where p ∈ P
and w ∈ Γ ∗. w stands for a snapshot of stack content. Suppose the config-
uration set of P is denoted by Conf(P). We have a transition relation ։⊆
Conf(P) × Conf(P) defined by the set of pushdown rules ∆ as follows: If
〈p, γ〉 →֒ 〈p′, w〉, then 〈p, γw′〉 ։ 〈p′, ww′〉 for all w′ ∈ Γ ∗. Let c0 be the ini-
tial configuration. We have a transition system corresponding to the pushdown
system as IP = (Conf(P),։, c0).
Each pushdown rule gives a pattern of program execution step. Without loss
of generality, we assume | w |≤ 2 in that any pushdown system can be put into
a normal form(| w |≤ 2) with linear size increase[18].
Definition 2 (Symbolic Pushdown System). A symbolic pushdown system
is a pushdown system with form (P0×G,Γ0×L,∆,C0). P0 is the set of symbolic
control locations, and Γ0 is stack alphabet. G and L are respectively the domain
of the control locations and stack symbols. The pushdown rules have a form
〈(p, g)(γ, l)〉 →֒ 〈(p′, g′), (γ1, l1), . . . , (γn, ln)〉, where p, p′ ∈ P0, γ, γ1, . . . , γn ∈
Γ0. The corresponding symbolic form separates the symbolic part from a relation
of valuations:
〈p, γ〉 →֒ 〈p′, γ1, . . . , γn〉 (g, l, g′, l1, . . . , ln) ∈ R
where R ⊆ (G×L)× (G×Ln) is a relation. Here we can also generally suppose
n 6 2. ∆ is the set of symbolic pushdown rules. C0 = ({p0}×G)× ({y0}×L) is
the set of initial configurations.
The global variables are encoded into control locations and the local variables
are encoded into the stack alphabet. Since we specify the control points of each
procedure with stack symbols, and the global and local variables are considered
as their value in R, P0 ×G can be simplified to G and the symbolic pushdown
rule is of form 〈γ〉 →֒ 〈γ1, . . . , γn〉, (g, l, g′, l1, . . . , ln) ∈ R.
2.3 Pushdown Rules Derivation
Suppose local variable x of procedure p is uniquely denoted by 〈p, x〉 ∈ P × Q,
where P is the domain of procedure tag and Q is the domain of local variable
name. Fig. 3 gives static analysis F to get the unified local variable set θ ⊆ P×Q.
Partial function η : P→ 2Q, η(p) = {x | 〈p, x〉 ∈ θ}, derives all local variables of
a procedure. Let N = {ni | i ∈ N} be a pool of control points from which we
get unique control point during pushdown rule derivation. In order to derive
pushdown rules for program, we define Φ(S, ni, nj, p,R) in Fig. 4. ni and nj
are respectively the entry and exit control point of S. ρ = dom(µ). R is a
set collecting information about variable variation and variable evaluation in
F(skip,p) = ∅ F(x := e,p) =
{
〈p, x〉 if x /∈ dom(µ)
∅ if x ∈ dom(µ)
F(S1; S2,p) = F(S1,p) ∪ F(S2,p) F(letvar x := e in S,p) = F(S,p) ∪ {〈p, x〉}
F(while e do S,p) = F(S,p) F(if e then S1 else S2,p) = F(S1,p) ∪ F(S2, p)
F((proc(in x1, out x2)S)(e, l), p) = {〈p
′, x1〉} ∪ F([l/x2]S,p
′), p′ is the tag of proc
Fig. 3. Unifying Local Variables
Φ(skip,ni,nj,p,R) = {〈(ρi)(ni, ηi(p))〉 →֒ 〈(ρi)(nj, ηi(p))〉 | R} (P-SKIP)
Φ(x := e,ni,nj,p,R) = {〈(ρi)(ni, ηi(p))〉 →֒ 〈(ρj)(nj, ηj(p))〉 | R
′} (P-UPDATE){
R′ = R ∪ {ρj[x] = e} ∧ ρj = ρi[x := e] ∧ ηj(p) = ηi(p), if x ∈ ρ
R′ = R ∪ {ηj(p)[x] = e} ∧ ρj = ρi ∧ ηj(p) = ηi(p)[x := e], if x ∈ η(p)
Φ(S1; S2,ni, nj,p,R) = Φ(S1,ni,nk,p,R) ∪ Φ(S2,nk,nj,p,R) (P-SEQ)
Φ(if e then S1 else S2, ni,nj,p,R) = {〈(ρi)(ni, ηi(p))〉 →֒ 〈(ρi)(nk, ηi(p))〉 | R ∪ {e}}
∪{〈(ρi)(ni, ηi(p))〉 →֒ 〈(ρi)(nl, ηi(p))〉 | R ∪ {!e}}
∪Φ(S1,nk,nj,p,R ∪ {e}) ∪ Φ(S2,nl,nj,p,R ∪ {!e})
(P-BRANCH)
Φ(while e do S,ni, nj,p,R) = {〈(ρi)(ni, ηi(p))〉 →֒ 〈(ρi)(nj, ηi(p))〉 | R ∪ {!e}}∪
{〈(ρi)(ni, ηi(p))〉 →֒ 〈(ρi)(nq, ηi(p))〉 | R ∪ {e}} ∪ Φ(S,nq,ni,p,R ∪ {e}) (P-LOOP)
Φ(letvar x := e in S,ni,nj,p,R) =
{〈(ρi)(ni, ηi(p))〉 →֒ 〈(ρi)(nk, ηi(p)[x := e])〉 | R ∪ {ηk(p)[x] = e}} ∪ Φ(S,nk,nj,p,R)
(P-BINDVAR)
Φ((proc(in x1, out x2)S)(e, l),ni,nj,p,R) =
{〈(ρi)(ni, ηi(p))〉 →֒ 〈(ρi)(nk, ηk(p
′)[x1 := e])(nj, ηi(p))〉 | R ∪ {ηk(p
′)[x1] = e}}
∪Φ([l/x2]S,nk,nq,p
′, ∅) ∪ {〈(ρq)(nq, ηq(p
′))〉 →֒ 〈(ρq)(ε)〉 | R}, p
′ is the tag of proc
(P-PROC)
Fig. 4. Derivation Rules for Pushdown System
{〈n1〉 →֒ 〈n3,n2〉 | {h
′ = h, l′ = l, x′1 = h, c
′ = c}}∪ {〈n4〉 →֒ 〈ε〉 | {h
′ = h, l′ = l}}∪
{〈n3〉 →֒ 〈n5〉 | {h
′ = h, l′ = l, x′1 = x1, c
′ = 0}}∪
{〈n5〉 →֒ 〈n7〉 | {x1 > 0, h
′ = h, l′ = l, x′1 = x1, c
′ = c}}∪
{〈n7〉 →֒ 〈n8〉 | {x1 > 0, h
′ = h, l′ = l, x′1 = x1, c
′ = c + 1}}∪
{〈n8〉 →֒ 〈n5〉 | {x1 > 0, h
′ = h, l′ = l, x′1 = x1 − 1, c
′ = c}}∪
{〈n5〉 →֒ 〈n6〉 | {x1 ≤ 0, h
′ = h, l′ = l, x′1 = x1, c
′ = c}}∪
{〈n6〉 →֒ 〈n4〉 | {h
′ = h, l′ = c, x′1 = x1, c
′ = c}}∪ {〈n2〉 →֒ 〈ε〉 | {h
′ = h, l′ = l}}
Fig. 5. Symbolic Pushdown Rules
statement transition for each pushdown rule. We extend R in P-BRANCH and
P-LOOP to record the precondition of control flow. R is initialized with ∅. ε
denotes the empty stack symbol.
In order to translate the derived pushdown rules into symbolic form, we
suppose the control point as explicit stack symbol. We prime left-side variables
of evaluation relations in R. Then we prime the post-transition global variables
and local variables in top stack symbol, also double-prime the post-transition
local variables in bottom stack symbol. For the variable holding its value during
transition, extend R with an equivalence relation of that variable. Then we derive
the symbolic form {〈ns〉 →֒ 〈(nt1) . . . (ntk)〉 | R}, (k = 0, 1, 2). Fig. 5 gives the
symbolic pushdown rules of the example calling procedure func in Section 1.
The derived symbolic pushdown system is sound on enforcing noninterference
for the core language programs as shown in the following theorem. Let µ = 〈ρ, θ〉
be the state of P . JPKµ means an execution of P with initial state µ. It returns
a final state µ′ or ⊥ if it does not terminate.
Theorem 1 (Soundness). Suppose P = (P, Γ,∆) is the pushdown system of
statement S. ∆ is derived by Φ(S, ni, nj , pk, ∅). ∀ρ0, θ0, µ0, λ0, JPK(〈ρ0, θ0〉) =
〈ρ′, θ′〉, (µ0, λ0, S) ↓ (µ
′, λ′). We have procedure pk on the top of procedure stack
of λ0 and λ
′. Suppose ∀l ∈ dom(µ), µ0(l) = ρ0[l], and ∀l ∈ dom(λ0) corresponds
to variable x of pk, λ0(l) = η0(pk)[x], we have
∀l ∈ dom(µ), µ′(l) = ρ′[l], and ∀l ∈ dom(λ′), if l corresponds to variable x of
pk,λ
′(l) = η′(pk)[x].
Proof: (See Appendix for details).
3 Noninterference Property Specification
In order to specify noninterference, we suppose the adversary can observe whether
program terminates. Then noninterference can be classified into termination-
sensitive(TS) and termination-insensitive(TI). TS requires the correlative pair-
ing executions of program both terminate or both unterminate. TI only judges
the low-equivalence of final states when both executions terminate, and does not
get violated if either execution unterminates. Let L ⊆ µ be the public variables of
program. We define low-equivalent relation =L as ∀x ∈ ρ, if x ∈ L, ρ1[x] = ρ2[x],
and ∀〈p, y〉 ∈ θ, if 〈p, y〉 ∈ L, η1(p)[y] = η2(p)[y]. Then TS and TI are formally
defined as follow.
Definition 3 (TS). A pushdown system P has a property of TS if it satisfies
∀µ1,µ2, µ1 =L µ2 ∧ JPKµ1 = µ′1 ⇒ ∃µ
′
2, JPKµ2 = µ
′
2 ∧ µ
′
1 =L µ
′
2.
Definition 4 (TI). A pushdown system P has a property of TI if it satisfies
∀µ1,µ2, µ1 =L µ2 ∧ JPKµ1 = µ
′
1 ⇒ JPKµ2 = ⊥∨ (∃µ
′
2, JPKµ2 = µ
′
2 ∧ µ
′
1 =L µ
′
2).
TI can be simplified by restricting the precondition:
Definition 5 (TI′). A pushdown system P has a property of TI if it satisfies
∀µ1,µ2, µ1 =L µ2 ∧ JPKµ1 = µ′1 ∧ JPKµ2 = µ
′
2 ⇒ µ
′
1 =L µ
′
2.
For simplicity, we only consider TI in the following. The LTL property w.r.t TS
can be derived similarly by method in [9].
3.1 Ordinary Self-Composition
The primary motivation of self-composition is to model two correlative runs of
program with indistinguishable inputs as a single run of composed program,
which greatly benefits the algorithmic verification techniques, such as model
checking, on the property expressing via temporal logics.
Suppose P1 and P2 are pushdown systems. µ1, µ′1 are states of P1, and µ2,
µ
′
2 are states of P2. Let µ1 ∩ µ2 = (ρ1 ∩ ρ2) ∪ (θ1 ∩ θ2). ⊕ is disjoint union of
memory. If µ1 ∩ µ2 = ∅, we define disjoint composition operation ⊲ of P1 and
P2 as
JP1K(µ1 ⊕ µ) = (µ′1 ⊕ µ) for some µ, and JP2K(µ
′ ⊕ µ2) = (µ′ ⊕ µ′2) for some µ
′,
iff JP1 ⊲ P2K(µ1 ⊕ µ2) = (µ′1 ⊕ µ
′
2).
Suppose µ = 〈ρ, θ〉 be the state of P . The state of P [ξ] is derived by renaming
the variables of P by function ξ : µ → 〈{x∗ | x ∈ ρ}, {〈p, y∗〉 | 〈p, y〉 ∈ θ}〉, such
that ∀x ∈ ρ, ξ(x) = x∗ and ∀〈p, y〉 ∈ θ, ξ(〈p, y〉) = 〈p, y∗〉. The ordinary self-
composition is defined based on disjoint composition and variable renaming,
and the corresponding TI is defined as:
Definition 6 (TI, ordinary self-composition). P has a property of TI iff
µ1 =L µ2 ∧ JP ⊲ P [ξ]K(µ1 ⊕ µ2) = (µ′1 ⊕ µ
′
2)⇒ µ
′
1 =L µ
′
2,
where µ1,µ
′
1 are states of P, and µ2,µ
′
2 are states of P [ξ].
The corresponding self-composing algorithm on pushdown system to derive
P ⊲ P [ξ] is proposed as follow.
1. Derive P [ξ] by substituting variables of P with the corresponding renamed
variables defined by ξ, and substituting each control point ni of P with n∗i .
2. Merge the pushdown rules of P and P [ξ].
3. Modify the last pushdown rule of P from 〈nfinal〉 →֒ 〈ε〉 to 〈nfinal〉 →֒ 〈n∗init〉,
and for the totalness of composed pushdown system, modify the last push-
down rule of P [ξ] from 〈n∗final〉 →֒ 〈ε〉 to 〈n
∗
final〉 →֒ 〈n
∗
final〉. Algorithm 1 is
used to find the last transition of original pushdown system.
4. For each rule of P , ∀x∗ ∈ ρ2, add x∗
′ = x∗ to R. For each 〈ni〉 →֒ 〈nj〉 of P ,
∀〈p, y∗〉 ∈ θ2, add η(p)[y∗]′ = η(p)[y∗] to R. For each 〈ni〉 →֒ 〈nk, nj〉 of P ,
∀〈p, y∗〉 ∈ θ2, add η(p)[y∗]′′ = η(p)[y∗] to R.
5. For each rule of P [ξ], ∀x ∈ ρ1, add x
′ = x to R. For each 〈n∗i 〉 →֒ 〈n
∗
j 〉 of P [ξ],
∀〈p, y〉 ∈ θ1, add η(p)[y]′ = η(p)[y] to R. For each 〈n∗i 〉 →֒ 〈n
∗
k, n
∗
j 〉 of P [ξ],
∀〈p, y〉 ∈ θ1, add η(p)[y]′′ = η(p)[y] to R.
6. ∀〈p, y〉 ∈ θ1, add η(p)[y]′ = η(p)[y] to R of 〈nfinal〉 →֒ 〈n∗init〉.
Then TI can be expressed by linear temporal logic and verified on this composed
pushdown system by model checking. P has a property of TI if and only if
P ⊲ P [ξ] satisfies (µ1 =L µ2)⇒ G(n∗final ⇒ (µ1 =L µ2)).
Algorithm 1: LastTransitionFinding
toV isit := startConf〈p, γ0〉.γ0; visited := ∅;
while toV isit 6= ∅ do
cur := toV isit.head; toV isit := toV isit \ {cur};
forall the t ∈ trans 6= ∅ do
if t.expr = 〈p, cur〉 →֒ 〈p, γ′, γ′′〉 ∧ ¬find(γ′′, visited) then
toV isit := toV isit ∪ {γ′′};
if t.expr = 〈p, cur〉 →֒ 〈p, γ′〉 ∧ ¬find(γ′, visited) then
toV isit := toV isit ∪ {γ′};
if t.expr = 〈p, cur〉 →֒ 〈p, ǫ〉 then
return t;
end
visited := visited ∪ {cur};
end
3.2 Compact Self-Composition
Since our approach is based on symbolic model checking, the variable count has
great impact on the size of binary decision diagram (BDD) and performance
of model checker. The increase in variable count after ordinary self-composition
seriously decreases the efficiency of model checking. This motivates us to find
new self-composing methods in inter-procedural settings. The compact form of
self-composition relies on the following two assumptions
– All the variables observable by the adversary are global. That means to treat
the procedure with observation point in it as main procedure.
– All local variables are initialized before being used in procedure, and vanish
while procedure returns, thus are considered as high.
Let µ1 ⊕l µ2 = µ1 ⊕ ρ2 = 〈ρ1, θ1〉 ⊕ ρ2, and µ1 ⊕r µ2 = ρ1 ⊕ µ2 = ρ1 ⊕ 〈ρ2, θ2〉.
Suppose ⊕ρ is the disjoint union of global variables, we have compact disjoint
composition ⊲ρ of P1 and P2, where JP1K(µ1 ⊕l µ) = (µ
′
1 ⊕ µ) for some µ, and
JP2K(µ′ ⊕r µ2) = (µ′ ⊕ µ′2) for some µ
′, iff JP1 ⊲ρ P2K(µ1 ⊕ρ µ2) = (µ′1 ⊕ρ µ
′
2).
Definition 7 (TI,compact self-composition). P has a property of TI iff
ρ1 =L ρ2 ∧ JP ⊲ρ P [ξ]K(µ1 ⊕ρ µ2) = (µ′1 ⊕ρ µ
′
2)⇒ ρ
′
1 =L ρ
′
2
The self-composing algorithm w.r.t compact form is derived by modifying
step 4 to step 6 of the algorithm in Section 3.1 to the following strategies
4′. For each rule of P , ∀x∗ ∈ ρ2, add x∗
′ = x∗ to R.
5′. For each rule of P [ξ], ∀x ∈ ρ1, add x′ = x to R.
A unified algorithm of ordinary and compact forms of self-composition is
illustrated by Algorithm 2. Suppose P .lvars : CP 7→ 2Q be a mapping from the
set of control points to a set of local variables related to certain procedure. Also
suppose procedure tag pi is represented by the set of control points arrived during
execution of this procedure. Then we have P .lvars(γ) = {x|γ ∈ pi, 〈pi, x〉 ∈ θ}.
3.3 Contracted Self-Composition
According to the assumptions given in Section 3.2, we know that noninterference
property at certain observation point of program does not really care the value of
local variables in the callee procedures. By the algorithm of Section 3.2, we have
reduced the length of R accompanying pushdown rules. But what if we want to
reduce the states of composed program? Since the adversary can only observe
the global variables of main procedure, we can avoid duplicating memory of
local variables by making the composed part of main procedure call the original
callee, instead of the composed callee, as original part of main procedure does.
This form of self-composition additionally relies on the following assumption:
– Global variable can not be used in callee procedure unless it is passed as
parameter of callee procedure.
With the contracted form of self-composition, we do not compose callee proce-
dures. Therefore we could not express the direct effect of newly defined global
variables on local variables of callee procedures. The state of P [ξ′] is derived
by ξ′ : 〈ρ, θ〉 → 〈{x∗ | x ∈ ρ}, θ〉 such that ∀x ∈ ρ, ξ′(x) = x∗ and ∀〈p, y〉 ∈
θ, ξ′(〈p, y〉) = 〈p, y〉. We have TI w.r.t a contracted form.
Algorithm 2: Ordinary and Compact Self Composition
Data: P , sc mode
Result: P ⊲ P [ξ]
begin
forall the x ∈ P .gvars do
P [ξ].gvars := P [ξ].gvars ∪ {ξ(x)};
end
(P ⊲ P [ξ]).gvars := P .gvars∪ P [ξ].gvars;
forall the γ ∈ CP do
forall the x ∈ P .lvars(γ) do P [ξ].lvars(γt) := P [ξ].lvars(γt)∪{ξ(x)};
end
P [ξ].startConf := 〈P .startConf.p,Append(P .startConf.γ, ′t′)〉;
(P ⊲ P [ξ]).startConf := P .startConf ;
forall the t ∈ P .trans do
if t.expr = 〈p, γ〉 →֒ 〈p, γ′γ′′〉 then
if sc mode = ordinary then
P [ξ].trans := P [ξ].trans ∪ {〈p, γt〉 →֒ 〈p, γ′t, γ′′t〉|
(t.rel) ξ(x)
x
∧
∧
xi∈P.gvars
(x′i = xi) ∧
∧
xi∈P.lvars(γ)
(x′′i = xi)};
t.rel := t.rel ∧
∧
xi∈P[ξ].gvars
(x′i = xi) ∧
∧
xi∈P[ξ].lvars(γt)
(x′′i =
xi);
if sc mode = compact then
P [ξ].trans := P [ξ].trans ∪ {〈p, γt〉 →֒ 〈p, γ′t, γ′′t〉|
(t.rel) ξ(x)
x
∧
∧
xi∈P.gvars
(x′i = xi)};
t.rel := t.rel ∧
∧
xi∈P[ξ].gvars
(x′i = xi);
else if t.expr = 〈p, γ〉 →֒ 〈p, γ′〉 then
if sc mode = ordinary then
P [ξ].trans := P [ξ].trans ∪ {〈p, γt〉 →֒ 〈p, γ′t〉|
(t.rel) ξ(x)
x
∧
∧
xi∈P.gvars∪P.lvars(γ)
(x′i = xi)};
t.rel := t.rel ∧
∧
xi∈P[ξ].gvars∪P[ξ].lvars(γt)
(x′i = xi);
if sc mode = compact then
P [ξ].trans := P [ξ].trans ∪ {〈p, γt〉 →֒ 〈p, γ′t〉|
(t.rel) ξ(x)
x
∧
∧
xi∈P.gvars
(x′i = xi)};
t.rel := t.rel ∧
∧
xi∈P[ξ].gvars
(x′i = xi);
else /* t.expr = 〈p, γ〉 →֒ 〈p, ǫ〉 */
if t = LastT ransitionF inding(P) then
P [ξ].trans := P [ξ].trans ∪ {〈p, γt〉 →֒ 〈p, γt〉|
(t.rel) ξ(x)
x
∧
∧
xi∈P.gvars
(x′i = xi)};
if sc mode = ordinary then
P .trans := (P .trans \ {t}) ∪ {〈p, γ〉 →֒ P [ξ].startConf |
(t.rel) ∧
∧
xi∈P.lvars(γ)∪P[ξ].gvars∪P[ξ].lvars(γt)
(x′i = xi)};
if sc mode = compact then
P .trans := (P .trans \ {t}) ∪ {〈p, γ〉 →֒ P [ξ].startConf |
(t.rel) ∧
∧
xi∈P[ξ].gvars
(x′i = xi)};
else /* last transition of other procedures except main */
P [ξ].trans := P [ξ].trans ∪ {〈p, γt〉 →֒ 〈p, ǫ〉|
(t.rel) ξ(x)
x
∧
∧
xi∈P.gvars
(x′i = xi)};
t.rel := t.rel ∧
∧
xi∈P[ξ].gvars
(x′i = xi);
end
end
end
(P ⊲ P [ξ]).trans := P .trans ∪ P [ξ].trans;
if sc mode = ordinary then
forall the x ∈ P .lvars(γ) do
P .lvars(γ) := P .lvars(γ) ∪ {ξ(x)};
P [ξ].lvars(γt) := P [ξ].lvars(γt) ∪ {x};
end
forall the γ ∈ CP do
(P ⊲ P [ξ]).lvars := (P ⊲ P [ξ]).lvars ∪ {γ 7→ P .lvars(γ), γt 7→
P [ξ].lvars(γt)};
end
end
Definition 8 (TI,contracted self-composition). P has a property of TI iff
ρ1 =L ρ2 ∧ JP ⊲ρ P [ξ′]K(µ1 ⊕ρ µ2) = (µ′1 ⊕ρ µ
′
2)⇒ ρ
′
1 =L ρ
′
2
The related self-composing algorithm distinguishes pushdown rules of main pro-
cedure from pushdown rules of callee procedures.
1. Derive P [ξ′] by substituting variables of P with renamed variables defined
by ξ′. For pushdown rules of main procedure, substitute each 〈ni〉 →֒ 〈nj〉
with 〈n∗i 〉 →֒ 〈n
∗
j 〉, 〈ni〉 →֒ 〈ε〉 with 〈n
∗
i 〉 →֒ 〈ε〉, and 〈ni〉 →֒ 〈nk, nj〉 with
〈n∗i 〉 →֒ 〈nk, n
∗
j 〉.
2. Merge P [ξ′] and P , taking duplicated pushdown rules only once.
3. Same as step 3 in Section 3.1.
4. Same as step 4′ and 5′ in Section 3.2.
The corresponding LTL-expressed TI for compact self-composition and con-
tracted self-composition is (ρ1 =L ρ2) ⇒ G(n∗final ⇒ (ρ1 =L ρ2)). Let RT
be the set of global variables used as the store of return value of the callee pro-
cedures. The algorithm is described in detail by Algorithm 3. Our experiments
in Section 4 illustrate the improvement on efficiency brought by these derived
forms of self-composition.
4 Experiments
The main purpose of our experiments is to reveal that the derived forms of self-
composition, compared with the ordinary form, can really improve the efficiency
of verification. Also we make clear how we could benefit from the procedural
settings and model checking.
We have implemented all three forms of self-composition for symbolic push-
down system. This is a static transformation before the pushdown system parsing
phase. Self-composed pushdown system is generated and related Moped options
are set. We add command-line options to Moped version 1. We also implicitly
require the derived variables and control points in composed program tagged by
postfix -t, especially the final control point named as final. With this assump-
tion, user can express TI/TS noninterference by LTL from the original symbolic
pushdown system instead of the one after self-composition. All experiments were
performed on a laptop with 1.66 GHz Intel Core 2 CPU and 1 GB RAM run-
ning Linux Fedora Core 6. The BDD library used by Moped is CUDD 2.3.1.
Experimental results are partially presented in Table 1.
In this table, #gvars and #lvars give the number of global variables and
the number of local variables respectively. #pubs represents the number of pub-
lic/low variables. N gives the number of bit of each integer variable. As shown
in Fig. 6, larger N causes increase in consumed time and memory. Fortunately
however, the secure/insecure judgement made by our method is mostly insensi-
tive to N , thus we could set N as small as possible to outperform other methods.
The only matter is to ensure the range of integer (0 ∼ 2N − 1) cover the con-
stant value assigned to it. The basic checking result Yes reports the program is
secure, while the answer No, along with the witness path generated as a coun-
terexample, not only tells the program is insecure, but facilitates our method on
Algorithm 3: Contracted Self Composition
Data: P
Result: P ⊲ρ P [ξ
′]
begin
forall the x ∈ P .gvars \ RT do
P [ξ′].gvars := P [ξ′].gvars ∪ {ξ′(x)};
end
(P ⊲ρ P [ξ
′]).gvars := P .gvars ∪ P [ξ′].gvars;
(P ⊲ρ P [ξ
′]).lvars := P .lvars;
forall the γ ∈ CPMain do
forall the x ∈ P .lvars(γ) do
(P ⊲ρ P [ξ
′]).lvars := (P ⊲ρ P [ξ
′]).lvars ∪ {γt 7→ x};
end
P [ξ′].startConf := 〈P .startConf.p,Append(P .startConf.γ, ′t′)〉;
(P ⊲ρ P [ξ
′]).startConf := P .startConf ;
forall the t ∈MainTrans(P .trans) do
if t.expr = 〈p, γ〉 →֒ 〈p, ǫ〉 then
P [ξ′].trans := P [ξ′].trans ∪ {〈p, γt〉 →֒ 〈p, γt〉|
(t.rel) ξ
′(x)
x∈P.gvars\RT
∧
∧
xi∈P.gvars\RT
(x′i = xi)};
else if t.expr = 〈p, γ〉 →֒ 〈p, γ′〉 then
P [ξ′].trans := P [ξ′].trans ∪ {〈p, γt〉 →֒ 〈p, γ′t〉|
(t.rel) ξ
′(x)
x∈P.gvars\RT
∧
∧
xi∈P.gvars\RT
(x′i = xi)};
else /* t.expr = 〈p, γ〉 →֒ 〈p, γ′, γ′′〉 */
P [ξ′].trans := P [ξ′].trans ∪ {〈p, γt〉 →֒ 〈p, γ′, γ′′t〉|
(t.rel) ξ
′(x)
x∈P.gvars\RT
∧
∧
xi∈P.gvars\RT
(x′i = xi)};
end
t.rel := t.rel ∧
∧
xi∈P[ξ
′].gvars(x
′
i = xi);
end
(P ⊲ρ P [ξ
′]).trans := P .trans ∪ P [ξ′].trans;
end
Algorithm 4: MainTrans (used in Algorithm 3)
toV isit := startConf〈p, γ0〉.γ0; visited := ∅; r trans := ∅;
while toV isit 6= ∅ do
cur := toV isit.head; toV isit := toV isit \ {cur};
forall the t ∈ trans 6= ∅ do
if t.expr = 〈p, cur〉 →֒ 〈p, γ′, γ′′〉 ∧ ¬find(γ′′, visited) then
toV isit := toV isit ∪ {γ′′}; r trans := r trans ∪ t;
if t.expr = 〈p, cur〉 →֒ 〈p, γ′〉 ∧ ¬find(γ′, visited) then
toV isit := toV isit ∪ {γ′}; r trans := r trans ∪ t;
if t.expr = 〈p, cur〉 →֒ 〈p, ǫ〉 then
r trans := r trans ∪ t;
end
visited := visited ∪ {cur};
end
return r trans;
Prog |Prog| #gvars #lvars #pubs Yes N ordinary compact
/No Time(s) Mem(MB) Time(s) Mem(MB)
ttaa1 13 3 2 2 Yes 9 0.01 45.82 0.01 45.58
ttaa2 14 3 2 2 No 8 0.16 41.99 0.03 41.95
ttaa3 22 4 3 3 Yes 8 1.86 49.61 1.52 48.87
1 <0.01 4.74 <0.01 4.71
lgj 13 3 1 2 Yes 9 <0.01 4.65 <0.01 4.65
func1 12 2 2 1 No 8 4.45 36.68 2.48 19.02
hu1 54 2 33 1 No 1 – – 12.10 73.19
hu2 70 2 17 1 No 3 4.11 53.61 0.21 14.62
hu2 func 26 3 1 1 No 8 1.44 35.63 1.40 34.92
hu3 63 60 0 20 No 1 — — 0.07 202.56
hu3* 63 60 0 40 No 1 — — 128.16 1015.61
mod imap 526 9 13 8 No 4 14.00 34.55 11.25 32.88
5 404.79 65.40 327.93 55.09
Table 1. Experimental Results
reasoning the flow path from certain high variable to low variables. In another
word, the single counterexample identified by model checker could tell us the
flow-source variable with security level high. This is the first step to fix the flaw
of program, and probably the most obvious benefit provided by model checking.
Consider again the program calling func in Section 1, the snapshot is presented
in Fig. 7 where N = 1. We can clearly observe the difference of l and lt at ob-
servation point comes from the difference on value of h and ht at the beginning
of execution. The illegal flow is performed by transition rule from f4 to f5.
Program ttaa1, ttaa2 and ttaa3 are respectively programs presented in
Figure 1, Figure 4 and Figure 9 of [10]. In [10] the authors report a failure
on verifying ttaa3 secure using BLAST. Here using our method we can verify
this program secure. hu1, hu2 and hu3 model the program expr1.c, expr2.c
and expr4.c of [12]. In order to explain the benefit from procedural setting, we
encapsulate the if-branch of hu2 into a procedure and change hu2 to a program
calling this procedure for sixteen times. The resulting program is hu2 func.
The evaluation results are illustrated by Fig. 6. Compared with ordinary self-
composition of hu2, consumed time and memory are greatly reduced by the
ordinary self-composition of hu2 func. To make clear the effectiveness of the
derived forms of self-composition, we did ordinary and compact self-composition
on hu2 (since no procedure exists, the contracted form is not available) and
all three forms of self-composition on hu2 func. The time reduction by using
compact form is more notable on hu2 than on hu2 func. This is because hu2
has more local variables, and the conjunction of relations in R is much shorter
for compact form than ordinary form. That means each symbolic pushdown rule
of derived pushdown system corresponds to more explicit pushdown rules and
smaller BDD. The only one local variable of hu2 func could not make this effect
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Fig. 6. Time and Memory Comparison
obvious. The contracted form could outperform the compact form because the
number of derived local variables is reduced to half compared with compact
self-composition and the number of pushdown rules is also reduced. hu3 can be
verified insecure in two aspects. First, it can leak path information of whether
branch with condition b10 is taken. Here we need to specify the initial value
of lowi(i = 1, 2, . . . , 20) to be 0 (See hu3 in Table 1). Second, we can reveal
that low10 leaks high10 by specifying the original part and the composed part
of derived pushdown system take the same path (bi = bti, i = 1, 2, . . . , 20) (See
hu3* in Table 1). Here the path conditions bi should be global. Without any
local variable, the ordinary form and compact form of hu3 are of no difference
and we record experiment results of either instead of both in Table 1.
To show the realistic usage of our method, we have verified the standard
module mod imap.c of Apache 1.3.23. This program is also verified as an im-
portant experiment in [12]. In the imap url function of this program, a possible
tainted Referer url could be returned and passed to menu ∗ functions and then
to the arguments of ap rvputs. ap rvputs passes these arguments to client
browser and causes a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability. To check cross-
site scripting, we need to consider the parameters of ap rvputs as variables
with high integrity, while the returned HTTP REFERER has low integrity. The
dual verification problem on integrity means to decide the high variables hold
the following relation (µ1 =H µ2) ⇒ G(n∗final ⇒ (µ1 =H µ2)). Since Moped
can only deal with integer and boolean variables and array of both types, we
have to first abstract string to integer, and model the string operations using
binary operations of integers. To ensure that the abstract integer variable could
be assigned by constant value modeling constant string, N could not be less
than 4. We have successfully verified this program insecure, and according to
the experimental results, the efficiency of our method under proper abstraction
is competitive to other methods [12].
Fig. 7. Snapshot of Counterexample
5 Discussions
To the language presented in Section 2.1, we require the out parameter of pro-
cedure to refer to global variable. Because in symbolic pushdown rules of callee
procedure, the stack symbols do not contain the stack symbol of caller. We can-
not express the effect to the local variables of caller directly in one pushdown
rule, including return action, of callee. This problem comes from the definition
of transition relation ։ of IP corresponding to pushdown system P . We can
solve this problem by storing the out value referring to the caller’s local variable
in the common part of caller’s rules and callee’s rules, that is the global variables
as control locations. That means we need to add an additional control location
r for the out value. In P-PROC of Fig. 4, we need to substitute x2 in procedure
body S with r instead of l, and add a rule for the caller to assign value of r to
its local variable. This additional global variable could also help us to store the
return value of language whose procedure has side effect. A possible ambiguity
is the security level of this additional global variable. We could set it high to
avoid invalid information flow caused by its change. Also we do not consider
parameters with inout type since an inout parameter can be trivially eliminated
by one in and one out parameter.
Model checking based approaches are usually argued against the efficiency
problem and state explosion. Although the derived forms of self-composition
we develop could greatly improve the efficiency, the complexity of satisfiability
for LTL is complete for PSPACE[20][21]. Also the ordinary partial correctness
specified by self-composition is undecidable while type-based approaches are
generally much faster.
As we have stated in last section, Moped can only deal with boolean and
integer variables and arrays, and each integer variable should have a finite range
of 0 ∼ 2N − 1. This makes abstraction necessary for verifying realistic programs.
So we plan to scale up our approach to more real applications by adapting proper
approaches on abstraction, possibly using some recently developed tools[22][23].
Because all forms of self-composition are developed on symbolic pushdown sys-
tem, the influence of abstraction on self-composition should be little.
When the program has a great many constants, certain information flow will
be omitted if the initial N is too small. But larger N means increase on time
and memory consumption, as we can see in Fig. 6. Therefore it is sometimes
difficult to balance the exactness and the efficiency by choosing proper initial
value of N . Another restriction of our approach is that with the deterministic
nature of the model our approach has not scaled to concurrent programs. Our
future work will adapt our approach to handle concurrency using some formal
models[24][25].
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
We give some preliminary definitions before the detailed proof. We define a mapping
G : P × Q × I → L from local variables of pushdown system to memory locations of
current stack in operational semantics. I contains the depth of procedure call frommain
to the procedure which local variable belongs to. If we have l = G(pk, x, i) ∈ dom(λ),
that means l stands for local variable x of procedure pk, and pk is on the ith position
of procedure stack. Let it ∈ I be the top-most procedure of current stack. We claim
a common constraint to the language semantics that currently executing procedure
cannot operate on the local variables of other procedures. Thus if l := e (l ∈ dom(λ))
is executed in calling procedure pk, there must be a 〈pk, x〉, where l = G(pk, x, it) and
the corresponding statement is x := e.
We inductively prove that for each derivation rule Φ(S, ni, nj , p, ∅), the transition
from µi to µj is operationally sound to the change from (µ0, λ0) to (µ
′, λ′) if (µ0, λ0, S) ↓
(µ′, λ′).
1. SKIP
µ′ = µ0, λ
′ = λ0. (SKIP) ρ
′ = ρ0, η
′(p) = η0(p). (P-SKIP)
∀l ∈ dom(µ), µ0(l) = ρ0[l]⇒ µ
′(l) = ρ′[l]
Since λ′ = λ0, ∀l ∈ dom(λ
′)⇒ l ∈ dom(λ0). If l = G(p, x, it), λ0(l) = η0(p)[x], thus
λ′(l) = η0(p)[x]. Since η
′(p) = η0(p), we have ∀x ∈ η(p), η
′(p)[x] = η0(p)[x]. Thus
λ′(l) = η′(p)[x].
2. UPDATE
If l0 ∈ dom(µ).(l0 ∈ ρ).
µ′ = µ0[l0 := v], λ
′ = λ0.(UPDATE-HEAP)
ρ′ = ρ0[l0 := e], η
′(p) = η0(p). (P-UPDATE)
∀l ∈ dom(µ) \ {l0}, µ
′(l) = µ0(l), ρ
′[l] = ρ0[l], since µ0(l) = ρ0[l], then µ
′(l) = ρ′[l],
and since µ′(l0) = ρ
′[l0] = v, we have ∀l ∈ dom(µ), µ
′(l) = ρ′[l].
Since λ′ = λ0,∀l ∈ dom(λ
′) ⇒ l ∈ dom(λ0). If l = G(p, x, it), λ0(l) = η0(p)[x], thus
λ′(l) = η0(p)[x]. Since η
′(p) = η0(p), we have ∀x ∈ η(p), η
′(p)[x] = η0(p)[x]. Thus
λ′(l) = η′(p)[x].
If l0 ∈ dom(λ0),∃〈p, x0〉, l0 = G(p, x0, it), the corresponding statement of pushdown
system is x0 := e.
µ′ = µ0, λ
′ = λ0[l0 := v]. (UPDATE-STACK)
ρ′ = ρ0, η
′(p) = η0(p)[x0 := e]. (P-UPDATE)
∀l ∈ dom(µ), µ′(l) = µ(l), ρ′[l] = ρ0[l], since µ0(l) = ρ0[l], then µ
′(l) = ρ′[l].
∀l ∈ dom(λ′) \ {l0}, λ
′(l) = λ0(l), if l = G(p, x, it), λ0(l) = η0(p)[x] ∧ x 6= x0,
thus we have η′(p)[x] = η0(p)[x], λ
′(l) = λ0(l) = η0(p)[x] = η
′(p)[x]. Also we have
λ′(l0) = η
′(p)[x0] = v. Therefore ∀l ∈ dom(λ
′), if l = G(p, x, it), λ
′(l) = η′(p)[x].
3. SEQ

(
∀l ∈ dom(µ1), µ1(l) = ρ1[l]∧
∀l ∈ dom(λ1), if ∃〈p, x〉, l = G(p, x, it), then λ1(l) = η1(p)[x]
)
⇒(
∀l ∈ dom(µ1), µ
′
1(l) = ρ
′
1[l]∧
∀l ∈ dom(λ′1), if ∃〈p, x〉, l = G(p, x, it), then λ
′
1(l) = η
′
1(p)[x]
)

 (I)


(
∀l ∈ dom(µ2), µ2(l) = ρ2[l]∧
∀l ∈ dom(λ2), if ∃〈p, x〉, l = G(p, x, it), then λ2(l) = η2(p)[x]
)
⇒(
∀l ∈ dom(µ2), µ
′
2(l) = ρ
′
2[l]∧
∀l ∈ dom(λ′2), if ∃〈p, x〉, l = G(p, x, it), then λ
′
2(l) = η
′
2(p)[x]
)

 (II)
(
∀l ∈ dom(µ0), µ0(l) = ρ0[l]∧
∀l ∈ dom(λ0), if ∃〈p, x〉, l = G(p, x, it), then λ0(l) = η0(p)[x]
)
∧
µ1 = µ0 ∧ λ1 = λ0 ∧ ρ1 = ρ0 ∧ η1(p) = η0(p)∧ (I) ⇒(
∀l ∈ dom(µ1), µ
′
1(l) = ρ
′
1[l]∧
∀l ∈ dom(λ′1), if ∃〈p, x〉, l = G(p, x, it), then λ
′
1(l) = η
′
1(p)[x]
)
(III)
µ2 = µ
′
1 ∧ λ2 = λ
′
1 ∧ ρ2 = ρ
′
1 ∧ η2(p) = η
′
1(p)∧ (III) ⇒(
∀l ∈ dom(µ2), µ
′
2(l) = ρ
′
2[l]∧
∀l ∈ dom(λ′2), if ∃〈p, x〉, l = G(p, x, it), then λ
′
2(l) = η
′
2(p)[x]
)
(IV)
µ′ = µ′2 ∧ λ
′ = λ′2 ∧ ρ
′ = ρ′2 ∧ η
′(p) = η′2(p)∧ (IV) ⇒(
∀l ∈ dom(µ′), µ′(l) = ρ′[l]∧
∀l ∈ dom(λ′), if ∃〈p, x〉, l = G(p, x, it), then λ
′(l) = η′(p)[x]
)
.
4. CONDITIONAL-BRANCH
If (µ0, λ0, e) ↓ true, the branch conditions in R show that the transition from ni
to nj is executed by {〈(ρi)(ni, ηi(p))〉 →֒ 〈(ρi)(nk, ηi(p))〉 | R ∪ {e}} and the rules
generated by Φ(S1, nk, nj , p, R ∪ {e}). We have ρk = ρ0 ∧ ηk(p) = η0(p),(
∀l ∈ dom(µ0), µ0(l) = ρ0[l] = ρk[l]∧
∀l ∈ dom(λ0), if ∃〈p, x〉, l = G(p, x, it), then λ0(l) = η0(p)[x] = ηk(p)[x]
)
We can inductively get(
∀l ∈ dom(µ′), µ′(l) = ρ′[l]∧
∀l ∈ dom(λ′), if ∃〈p, x〉, l = G(p, x, it), then λ
′(l) = η′(p)[x]
)
If (µ0, λ0, e) ↓ false, the proof is similar.
5. LOOP
If (µ0, λ0, e) ↓ false, µ
′ = µ0, λ
′ = λ0. (WHILE-F)
From the branch condition in R of (P-LOOP) we can see the transition is exe-
cuted by pushdown rule {〈(ρi)(ni, ηi(p))〉 →֒ 〈(ρi)(nj , ηi(p))〉 | R ∪ {!e}}. Thus
ρ′ = ρ0, η
′(p) = η0(p).
∀l ∈ dom(µ0), µ0(l) = ρ0[l]⇒ µ
′(l) = ρ′[l]
Since λ′ = λ0,∀l ∈ dom(λ
′) ⇒ l ∈ dom(λ0). If l = G(p, x, it), λ0(l) = η0(p)[x],
thus λ′(l) = η0(p)[x]. Since η
′(p) = η0(p), then ∀x ∈ η(p), η
′(p)[x] = η0(p)[x]. Thus
λ′(l) = η′(p)[x].
If (µ0, λ0, e) ↓ true, we need to prove the execution of pushdown system before the
next time evaluation of e is sound to operational semantics.
ρq = ρ0, ηq(p) = η0(p).(P-LOOP)(
∀l ∈ dom(µ0), µ0(l) = ρ0[l] = ρq[l]∧
∀l ∈ dom(λ0), if ∃〈p, x〉, l = G(p, x, it), then λ0(l) = η0(p)[x] = ηq(p)[x]
)
⇒
(
∀l ∈ dom(µ′), µ′(l) = ρ′i[l]∧
∀l ∈ dom(λ′), if ∃〈p, x〉, l = G(p, x, it), then λ
′(l) = η′i(p)[x]
)
.
6. BINDVAR(
∀l ∈ dom(µ0), µ0(l) = ρ0[l]∧
∀l ∈ dom(λ0), if ∃〈p, x〉, l = G(p, x, it), then λ0(l) = η0(p)[x]
)
(I)

(
∀l ∈ dom(µ1), µ1(l) = ρ1[l]∧
∀l ∈ dom(λ1), if ∃〈p, x〉, l = G(p, x, it), then λ1(l) = η1(p)[x]
)
⇒(
∀l ∈ dom(µ2), µ2(l) = ρ2[l]∧
∀l ∈ dom(λ2), if ∃〈p, x〉, l = G(p, x, it), then λ2(l) = η2(p)[x]
)

 (II)
µ1 = µ0, λ1 = λ0 ⊎ [l0 := v] (l0 /∈ dom(µ0) ∧ l0 /∈ dom(λ0)). (BINDVAR)
ρ1 = ρ0, η1(p) = η0(p)[x0 := e]. (P-BINDVAR)
Therefore, ∀l ∈ dom(µ), µ1(l) = ρ1[l]. (III)
∀l ∈ dom(λ1) \ {l0}, l ∈ dom(λ0) ∧ λ0(l) = λ1(l), we have, if ∃〈p, x〉, l = G(p, x, it),
then λ0(l) = η0(p)[x] ∧ x 6= x0, thus η1(p)[x] = η0(p)[x].
Therefore ∀l ∈ dom(λ1) \ {l0}, if ∃〈p, x〉, l = G(p, x, it), λ1(l) = η1(p)[x]. And since
λ1(l0) = η1(p)[x0] = v, we have ∀l ∈ dom(λ1), if ∃〈p, x〉, l = G(p, x, it), then λ1(l) =
η1(p)[x]. (IV)
From (III)(IV)(II) we have(
∀l ∈ dom(µ2), µ2(l) = ρ2[l]∧
∀l ∈ dom(λ2), if ∃〈p, x〉, l = G(p, x, it), then λ2(l) = η2(p)[x]
)
µ′ = µ2, λ
′ = λ2 \ {l0}. (BINDVAR) ρ
′ = ρ2, η
′(p) = η2(p). (P-BINDVAR)
Therefore,
(
∀l ∈ dom(µ′), µ′(l) = ρ′[l]∧
∀l ∈ dom(λ′), if ∃〈p, x〉, l = G(p, x, it), then λ
′(l) = η′(p)[x]
)
7. PROC(
∀l ∈ dom(µ0), µ0(l) = ρ0[l]∧
∀l ∈ dom(λ0), if ∃〈p, x〉, l = G(p, x, it), then λ0(l) = η0(p)[x]
)
(I)


(
∀l ∈ dom(µ1), µ1(l) = ρ1[l]∧
∀l ∈ dom(λ1), if ∃〈p
′, x〉, l = G(p′, x, it), then λ1(l) = η1(p
′)[x]
)
⇒(
∀l ∈ dom(µ2), µ2(l) = ρ2[l]∧
∀l ∈ dom(λ2), if ∃〈p
′, x〉, l = G(p′, x, it), then λ2(l) = η2(p
′)[x]
)

 (II)
µ1 = µ0, λ1 = λ0 ⊎ [l
′ := v] (l′ /∈ dom(µ0) ∧ l
′ /∈ dom(λ0)). (CALL)
ρ1 = ρ0. Therefore ∀l ∈ dom(µ1), µ1(l) = ρ1[l]. (III)
∀l ∈ dom(λ1) \ {l
′}, l ∈ dom(λ0),¬∃〈p
′, x〉(l = G(p′, x, it)).
l′ = G(p′, x1, it) ∧ λ1(l
′) = η1(p
′)[x1] = v.
Therefore, ∀l ∈ dom(λ1), if ∃〈p
′, x〉, l = G(p′, x, it), then λ1(l) = η1(p
′)[x]. (IV)
From (III)(IV)(II) we have(
∀l ∈ dom(µ2), µ2(l) = ρ2[l]∧
∀l ∈ dom(λ2), if ∃〈p
′, x〉, l = G(p′, x, it), then λ2(l) = η2(p
′)[x]
)
µ′ = µ2, λ
′ = λ2 \ {l
′}. (CALL) ρ′ = ρ2, η
′(p) = η0(p). (P-PROC)
Therefore, ∀l ∈ dom(µ), µ′(l) = ρ′[l].
Procedure p is on top of procedure stack, so dom(λ0) = dom(λ
′). Since procedure
p′ cannot modify local variables in λ′, we have ∀l ∈ dom(λ′), λ′(l) = λ0(l). Since
η′(p) = η0(p), we have ∀l ∈ dom(λ
′), if ∃〈p, x〉, l = G(p, x, it), then λ
′(l) = η′(p)[x].
